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Abstract: The aim of the paper is to investigate ping-pong diplomacy between 
the Unites States and China, which was used by both countries as a diplomatic 
tool, aimed at achieving political rapprochement despite ideological dissonance 
and conflict over Taiwan. Both governments were seeking a way to establish 
closer relations but the circumstances prevented them from traditional dip-
lomatic contacts. Sports exchange proved to be a convenient solution. In the 
paper the Author attempts to verify a hypothesis on a subsequent legacy of 
the ping-pong diplomacy in American foreign policy. The study allowed to 
determine reasons for the need to employ sport in order to establish closer rela-
tions between two hostile actors of international relations. It is an attempt to 
answer a question concerning the intentional or coincidental character of the 
analysed sports exchange. The paper is an empirical case study on one of the 
prime examples of positive sports diplomacy and was conducted with the use 
of decision-making. 
Keywords: ping-pong diplomacy; sports diplomacy; China-USA relations; interna-
tional relations; politics and sport
Introduction
The aim of the paper is to investigate the ping-pong diplomacy between the Unites 
States and China, one of the best known cases of sports diplomacy, within which 
a sports exchange in table-tennis between national teams of both countries was es-
1  The project has been financed by National Science Centre (Poland), grant no. 2015/19/D/
HS5/00513.
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tablished. The sports contact was then used as an opportunity for diplomatic talks 
which resulted in a breakthrough in bilateral relations. Generally the issue has been 
deeply investigated, especially in the United States. The objective is not to reveal new 
facts about it, but to discuss its legacy. Accordingly, the hypothesis on the subsequent 
legacy of ping-pong diplomacy in the American foreign policy, which is caused by 
its success, is tested in the paper. This legacy means a change in the way of thinking 
about sports and its diplomatic meaning in the US, especially in the 1970s. 
Apart from searching for the legacy of ping-pong diplomacy, the study allowed 
the author to observe the process and to determine the reasons for the need to employ 
sport in order to establish closer relations between two hostile actors (considering mu-
tual will to do so). Moreover, it is an attempt to answer a question on the intentional 
or coincidental character of sports exchange. The research is empirically-based and it 
is a case study of the best known example of positive sports diplomacy that fostered 
cooperation between antagonized nations. Decision-making approach has been applied 
to determine motivations of stake-holders and determinants of choices.
Historical background
In order to understand the issue of ping-pong diplomacy and its significance, it is 
necessary to shortly present historical context of the Sino-American relations. They 
were deeply influenced by the civil war in China between the communists led by Mao 
Tse-Tung (Máo Zédōng) and the nationalist Kuomintang’s government led by Chi-
ang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi). The conflict escalated after World War II and finished in 
1949 with the communists’ victory and the proclamation of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). The defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s government and its supporters escaped 
to Taiwan. This way two Chinese states were established, both questioning another’s 
existence and legitimacy. The Communist China governed the whole mainland and the 
most of population, whereas the Taiwanese government was in possession of evacuated 
Chinese gold reserves. What is more, it regarded itself as a continuer of the Chinese 
statehood. Such attitude influenced international response to the question of formal 
recognition of the Chinese states. The Republic of China (Taiwan) was recognized 
by the Western nations, while the Communist states established close relations with 
the PRC (Hill, 1996, p. 44).
Over time, the alliance between the PRC and the Soviet Bloc began to deteriorate, 
particularly after 1956 in respect to the criticism of Joseph Stalin voiced by Nikita 
Khrushchev in a speech at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, as the Chinese disagreed with the criticism. The tension between the USSR 
and the PRC got more intense in 1958, when the Chinese introduced an economic 
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and social campaign known as the Great Leap Forward, which was contradictory with 
the Soviet model. In 1963 the Sino-Soviet relations became almost confrontational 
(Roszkowski, 2005, pp. 120 – 121, 156). The situation was obviously unfavourable 
to both sides, particularly to China which was falling into isolation. As a result, 
Chinese leaders began to search for a way of open the country to the international 
community. It maintained close relations with the non-aligned countries, but con-
cerning its situation, establishing closer ties with the West was a natural, although 
risky solution. Relations with the US were particularly important as China desired 
to join United Nations, possibly bring Taiwan back under Beijing’s control and to 
some extent – to deter against the Soviet Union (Xu, 2008, p. 123). There were also 
other conditions that contributed to China’s decision to establish relations with the 
United States, such as the internal policy determinants in China including new policy 
towards the USSR, the concept of “three worlds” and the consequences of cultural 
revolution, the change of the internal policy in the USA and its consequences in 
foreign policy towards China and other Eastern Asian states. What is more, for certain 
time a limited dialogue between the two states was being conducted – through the 
“Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks in Warsaw”, although with no direct effect. Thus 
there was a number of reasons for the new standpoint of Chinese leadership towards 
the United States.  
The strategic position of the US was completely different at the beginning of 
the 1970s, but Americans were also interested in establishing closer relations with 
communist China, especially after Richard Nixon became the President. Nixon even 
before being elected claimed that the US need to reposition its policy regarding China. 
As he stated already in 1967, “taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave 
China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture their fantasies, cherish its 
hates and threaten its neighbours. There is no place on this small planet for a billion 
of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation” (Xu, 2008, p. 119). 
After becoming the President, Nixon made the issue of China one of his priorities. 
During presidential campaign he promised to withdraw from Vietnam with honour, 
so bearing in mind China’s engagement in the conflict, rapprochement with the PRC 
was desirable. What is more, Nixon thought that closer diplomatic relations with 
China may strengthen the American position in the Cold War. American President 
is also believed to have had a personal ambition to be remembered as the one who 
began the dialogue with China (Xu, 2008, pp. 119 – 120). All those arguments stand 
for the point that American-Chinese rapprochement reflected the need of both sides. 
What was preventing establishment of closer relation, then? 
The ideological dissonance between the two states seems to be the answer. PRC 
was a communist country, while the USA were the leader of the Western, capitalist 
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world. It was hardly possible to enhance the level of bilateral relations with the use of 
traditional diplomatic channels then. Admittedly, at the time China distanced itself 
from the USSR, but the ideology remained the key issue. Another important factor 
should be associated with the Republic of China (Taiwan), which government did not 
accept the existence of the PRC. Americans were maintaining diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan and US troops stationed on the island. Americans had to act very carefully 
then. However, apart from close relations with Taiwan, it is believed that there were 
no greater conflicts of national interests between the USA and the PRC. Moreover, 
Nixon presented a completely new approach to the issue of Taiwan – as he was reported 
to have said during a private conversation with Nicolae Caucescu, “Taiwan was not 
an international but an internal problem, to be resolved by the Chinese themselves 
in a peaceful way” (Xia, 2206, pp. 151 – 152, 154). 
As has been noted, at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s there 
was a will for political rapprochement expressed both by American and Chinese 
policy-makers, despite many unfavourable circumstances. As a result, various attempts 
to establish political contact were made, for example at the beginning of 1970 there 
was an initiative to arrange a high-profile meeting between the diplomats of both 
states. At the time all contacts had a form of secret diplomacy. After Nixon became the 
President, he once again tied to employ the earlier “Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks in 
Warsaw”, in which US and Chinese ambassadors to Poland met and talked in Warsaw, 
but with no effect (Itoh, 2011, pp. 16 – 17). A so called Pakistani channel – contacting 
via Pakistan’s diplomats – was more successful. This way China proposed that a special 
representative of American President, the Secretary of State or even the President 
himself could visit Beijing for the talks. The exchange of messages was leading to 
an arrangement of a secret meeting in order to prepare the official talks. Particularly 
Richard Nixon was to be insisting on the secrecy of these contacts, fearing that if the 
information about the meeting would come to light the Taiwanese lobby in America 
could prevent the rapprochement with China (Xia, 2006, pp. 154 – 155). 
It is worth noting, that the Pakistani channel and earlier the meetings of ambas-
sadors in Poland were not the first channels that Americans were trying to employ 
in order to establish contacts with Beijing. In the past Americans were also using the 
assistance of Dutch and French diplomats, but unsuccessfully both times. China and 
the US were also making gestures suggesting their readiness to improve the relations. 
For example in December 1970 Chinese People’s Daily published on its front page 
a picture of Mao Tse-Tung with his old friend, American journalist Edgar Snow at 
Tiananmen with a quotation “The people of the world, including the American people, 
are our friends”. During the pictured meeting Mao was reported to have said, that 
he would welcome Nixon to China (Xu, 2008, pp. 120, 123). This case presents the 
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true essence of pursuing sports diplomacy as an instrument enabling the initiation 
of traditional diplomatic talks. Taking the circumstances, it was extremely difficult if 
possible at all to begin an open dialogue, even though both sides were interested in it 
and secret contacts were established. An extraordinary move or gesture was needed, 
which sports diplomacy proved to be. The issue of Mao’s meeting with Edgar Snow 
is also worth noting here. Referring to foreigners, deemed “connoisseurs” of Chinese 
culture as “friends” and opening more insights to them appears to be one the Chinese 
diplomatic methods of swaying away from international conflicts. Although it has 
raised some controversies, it has proven to be rather effective concerning the obvious 
difficulty in appreciating Chinese culture. 
Towards Ping-Pong Diplomacy
Ping-pong diplomacy was preceded by Chinese participation in the 31st World Champi-
onships in table tennis held in Nagoya in Japan in March and April 1971. At the time, 
as a consequence of the conflict with Taiwan, the PRC was not a member of most of 
international sports federations after it withdrew from them in 1958 (Hill, 1995, p. 
xiii; Xu, 2008, p. 86, Espy, 1981, p. 63). However, China sustained its membership 
in International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF). Despite it did not compete in two 
previous world championships, Chinese government was planning to send team in 
1971. Prime minister Zhou Enlai (Zhōu Ēnlái), who often engaged himself in activi-
ties of sports diplomacy, met in China with the president of the Japan Table Tennis 
Federation Koji Goto – in order to discuss the possibility of participating in the forth-
coming championships. It was problematic that Taiwan was a member of Table Tennis 
Federation of Asia, while the PRC pursued a policy, according to which it could not be 
a member of any international sports organization that Taiwan belonged to. Despite 
this fact Enlai and Goto agreed upon China’s participation in the championships, what 
has been announced in People’s Daily on July 2, 1971 (Xu, 2008, pp. 127 – 128; Espy, 
1981, pp. 127 – 128). China was therefore set to participate in the world champion-
ships, what allowed the pursue of the Ping-pong diplomacy.
It should be noted, that Chinese leadership was not unanimous about the idea of 
sending national team to the table tennis world championships. Mao Tse-Tung and 
Zhou Enlai were in favour, while opposite views were presented by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and State Physical Culture and Sport Commission. Despite that Mao 
was determined to use the opportunity that sport offered and decided that Chinese 
team should go to Nagoya (Xia, 2006, p. 153).
In respect to the planned participation in the championships Enlai met with 
president of ITTF H. Roy Evans to discuss the issue of China’s return to international 
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competition. During the meeting Evans was reported to suggest, that after the tourna-
ment China could invite a couple of teams to play exhibition matches (Danner, 2012, 
p. 77). Zhour warmed to that suggestion, but it is unclear whether the future events 
were directly related to the meeting (Axelrod, 2009, p. 378). 
The PRC eventually took part in the table tennis world championships in Japan. 
Before departing, a send-off ceremony was organized in the Great Hall of the People. 
Prime minister Enlai asked athletes to abide the principle ‘friendship first, than 
competition’. There was also a number of instructions issued by the government 
concerning contacts with Americans. For instance, Chinese athletes were not allowed 
to be the first to greet or exchange flags, while they were allowed to shake hands (Xu, 
2008, p. 129). Those events illustrate the instrumental attitude of Chinese leadership 
towards sport. The guidelines concerning contacts with Americans may suggest, that 
China did not have a diplomatic plan concerning Ping-pong diplomacy at the time, 
or that it was hiding its true intentions.
Chinese participation in table tennis championships constituted an opportunity 
to make a direct contact with Americans. During the event Chinese world champion 
Zhuang Zedong (Zhuāng Zédòng) was reported to have talked to a member of 
American team Glenn Cowan, who was late for his team bus and got a ride by the 
Chinese team. The two man exchanged gifts and the Chinese offered an arrangement 
of Chinese-American table tennis meeting (Pigman, 2010, p. 193). Authors are not 
consistent about the actual formulation of the invitation though. There are views 
that it were the Americans who were seeking for the invitation to China while some 
other countries like Canada and Colombia were invited, but this was not expressed 
by an official position of American team but by a private opinion of an athlete (Xu, 
2008, p. 131; Xia, 2006, p. 153). There was no official position on the details of the 
contact, what might be intentional concerning the desire to keep the it secret.
Similarly to the issue of the PRC’s participation in the championships in Nagoya, 
the Chinese support for the idea of inviting American team was not shared by all 
political leaders in China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs was suggesting, that the invita-
tion might have an adverse impact on China. Enlai consulted Mao, who decided that 
Americans should be invited (Xia, 2006, p. 153). As a result, a formal invitation to 
play a series of matches in China was addressed to the American team on April 6, 
1971. It was preceded by a visit of a Chinese official Song Zhong in American team’s 
hotel. He asked the president of USA Table Tennis Association Rufford Harrison 
how he would react to an invitation to China? Harrison voiced his concern whether 
younger players would afford to rebook their tickets, but the Chinese offered to cover 
all the costs. A specialist on China in American embassy in Tokyo was responsible for 
the decision as the two countries did not maintain formal diplomatic relations. He 
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agreed and American table tennis players were to be the first delegation from the US 
in China since 1949, while Nixon himself recommended that visas should be issued 
to American journalists (Ladley, 2014, p. 197). 
The table tennis tour and its aftermath
As a result of the earlier developments, nine American table tennis players with four 
officials and two companions crossed the bridge between Hong Kong and mainland 
China on April 10, 1971. Americans visited Beijing, Shanghai and Hangzhou and 
played two exhibition matches (Axelrod, 2009, p. 378; Xu, 2008, p. 135). They were 
welcomed very warmly and enthusiastically. Chinese prime minister’s meeting with 
Chinese, American and four other teams in the Great Hall of the People on April 14 
was to be a highlight of the visit. At the time Zhou stated: “a new chapter has been 
opened in the relations between our two peoples. Your visit to China has opened the 
door to friendly contacts between our two countries. We believe that such friendly 
contacts will be favoured and supported by the majority of the two peoples” (Chen, 
1992, p. 62). A few hours later Washington lifted the trade embargo on China that 
was in force for 22 years and permitted trade of close equivalents goods exchanged 
with the USSR. Other gestures of the US encompassed termination of the American 
currency control in regard to China and visa facilitation for the Chinese visiting the 
United States (Xia, 2006, pp. 153 – 154; Pigman, 2010, p. 193). 
Shortly after the sports exchange the developments were rapid afterwards. In July 
1971 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited China and met with prime minister 
Zhou Enlai. The visit was secret, but Nixon soon made it public. Preparations for the 
American President’s journey to China were also initiated. In October 1971 Kissinger 
visited China again, this time officially, and talked on the details of future Nixon’s 
visit. Shortly afterwards a campaign was launched in China in order to explain to 
the public the transition in relations with the US. Richard Nixon arrived in China 
on February 21, 1972. During his visit an informal strategic agreement between the 
two states was signed (Goldstein, Freeman, 1990, pp. 109 – 111). Even earlier – in 
October 1971, communist China became a member of the United Nations, taking 
the seat of Republic of China, even though the formal diplomatic relations between 
the PRC and the US were not established until 1979, due to the issue of Taiwan. 
Nevertheless, the political and diplomatic consequences of the Ping-pong diplomacy 
were remarkable and far reaching.  
It should be noted, that although Chinese government if often perceived as 
a ‘monolith’, it is often more divided than it seems, as for example concerning the 
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attitude towards opening to the United States and sending team to table tennis cham-
pionships. In cases when no-one inside China is willing to take public responsibility 
for a policy choice, foreigners who are willing to do so may be instrumentalised for 
this purpose, what can be seen as another subtle Chinese diplomatic method. This 
has happened in the analysed Sino-American relations, when Nixon made the first 
Kissinger’s visit to China public.
Ping-pong diplomacy in just a few days remarkably changed the political climate 
concerning Sino-American relations. It was an example of sports diplomacy aimed 
at ‘paving way’ for establishing political relations in a situation of no formal ties 
between the two states. A question appears then, why sport was used for the sake of 
political rapprochement? As it appears, table tennis world championships in 1971 
were simply a convenient circumstance that both parties made use of. It should 
also be remembered, that Chinese policy-makers including Mao appeared to have 
understood the instrumental character of sport concerning diplomacy, as the country 
had employed sport to maintain friendly relations with other states before. Prime 
minister Zhou Enlai very often seized the opportunities to meet the athletes visiting 
China. After one of such meetings – with Soviet chess team, he was reported to have 
said, that as individuals those athletes were not important, but he met with them to 
show that the Chinese were friendly towards the Russians (Xu, 2008, p. 118). Such 
exchanges with actors that are ‘not personally important’, not necessarily concerning 
sport, might become signs of willingness to make important political of economical 
gestures, as lifting the trade embargo by the United States in the analysed case. 
Before Ping-pong diplomacy such activities were usually directed at countries with 
positive relations with the PRC, while the the analysed case involved two basically 
hostile states. 
According to Stuart Murray and Geoffrey Pigman (2014, p. 1101), Ping-pong 
diplomacy was meant as a tool of testing whether public opinion in both countries 
would accept a more formal diplomatic opening. Such view appears to be precise in 
diagnosing the aim of this diplomatic employment of sport. What is more, according 
to some authors, Chinese motivation of establishing table tennis exchange was to 
prepare the people to the turnover in relations with the US, both in political and 
in psychological sense (Xia, 2006, pp. 152 – 153). United States and the communist 
China for many years were perceiving each other as enemies. In this context Ping-
pong diplomacy had an internal context as well, whereas the external motivation was 
about creating opportunity for intergovernmental contacts. Although the two states 
exchanged messages before, the athletic contact served as a final announcement of 
a mutual desire for rapprochement. 
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The legacy of ping-pong diplomacy in the American foreign policy
The events related to ping-pong diplomacy have been evaluated as a great diplo-
matic success and an important step towards the full normalization eight years later 
(Johns, 2014, p. 2). As Zhou Enlai stated “never before in history has a sport been 
used so effectively as a tool of international diplomacy” (Bjola & Kornprobst, 2013, 
p. 91). As should be added, ‘never before and never again’, at least so far. If positive 
sports diplomacy is considered, it has been pursued many times by various states 
since famous table tennis exchange, but it has never been so successful and leading 
to such a breakthrough in bilateral relations, although on some occasions political 
rapprochement at least to some extent has been fostered. This applies for example to 
relations between Armenia and Turkey – presidents of those countries without formal 
diplomatic relations met twice on the occasions of football world cup qualification 
matches (within so called football diplomacy). In a similar manner political leaders 
from India and Pakistan employed cricket in order to bring the two nations closer at 
the times when tension between the countries was rising (within cricket diplomacy). 
Apparently though, the recipes of the employment of sport in shaping Sino-American 
relations left a legacy beyond those two nations as well.
The success of ping-pong  diplomacy had a deep impact of both China and 
America. In the aftermath, on numerous occasions China was employing sport for 
the sake of politics, for example athletes were instructed to lose particular matches, 
mostly with other communist countries, in order to deepen the inter-state friend-
ship. China was also building sports venues in the Third World countries, searching 
for closer relations (Hong, Xiaozheng, 2003, pp. 335 – 337). Apparently, the impact 
of ping-pong diplomacy on the society and policy-makers was even greater in the 
US. According to the main hypothesis, it even left a legacy, particularly in the 
1970s. It sparked imaginations on how sport may serve for the sake of diplomacy 
and politics, as a tool of rapprochement between unfriendly nations. Numerous 
attempts to repeat ping-pong diplomacy in relations with other countries validate 
this assumption. 
One of the most remarkable examples of a will to use the sport in a similar manner 
as the famous ping-pong diplomacy concerns American relations with Cuba, which 
were relatively similar to those with communist China, but also with differences such 
as geographical proximity and American cultural influence on Cuba despite the official 
hostility (Sugden, Tomlinson, McCartan, 2008, p. 222). Attempts have been made 
to establish exchanges in various sports, with baseball and basketball in particular. If 
baseball is concerned, first initiatives of re-establishing sports contacts were formulated 
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in 1971 (Turner, 2012, p. 131; Elias, 2010). Due to political reasons and reluctance 
of American administration, the first of such initiatives failed, but it was argued that 
baseball exchange could serve in a similar manner as the ping-pong diplomacy. For 
example, the Assistant Secretary of the US Department of State William Rogers wrote 
to the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger concerning an initiative in 1975, “A public 
relations move would correct some of the distortions in the public mind about the 
Cuban policy – shifting an emphasis to a non-political and non-governmental area. 
The Chinese ping-pong players were accepted by the US public as a good way to 
break the ice between countries separated by years decades of hostility. Baseball with 
Cuba could serve a similar purpose…” (Sugden, 2007, pp. 49 – 50). Despite that, 
for various reasons baseball diplomacy between the USA and Cuba was not initiated 
until 1987 (Turner, 2012, pp. 208, 210 – 213, 216). Attempts in basketball were 
more successful though, as in 1977 American Department of State agreed to a visit 
of a college team from South Dakota (a joint team of two universities) in Cuba to 
play against its national team (LeoGrande, Kornbluh, 2014, p. 157; South Dakota 
College…, 1977, p. 2/1), which was an initiative of two American senators James 
Abourezk and George McGovern (Abourezk, 1989, pp. 234 – 235; Palmer, 2010, p. 
479; Turner, 2012, p. 175). Both cases can be perceived as an effect of the success of 
ping-pong diplomacy. 
The impact of ping-pong diplomacy in the US can also be seen in regard to sports 
exchanges with the Soviet Union. Despite ideological conflict, the two Cold War 
superpowers were maintaining sports and cultural contacts, beginning from 1958 
when the first Cultural Agreement was signed (Richmond, 2003, p. 15). Exchanges 
in basketball and athletics appear to be the most important from the diplomatic 
perspective. Basketball series were played annually either in the USSR or in the US. 
Until 1972 when the basketball exchanges have been intensified, they did not attract 
greater attention though (Riordan, 1974, pp. 335 – 336). Although this intensification 
is usually associated with other reasons including political, the change of American 
attitude most probably was also influenced by the success of table tennis exchange with 
China. There have also been ideas to try “another ‘baseball diplomacy’” in relations 
with other countries, for instance with North Korea in 1979 (Public Papers…, 1979, 
p. 1153). Numerous anniversary events of ping-pong diplomacy are also a prove of 
its strong presence in public awareness in the US (Miller, 2011).
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Conclusion
Ping-pong diplomacy was undoubtedly a great diplomatic success, leading to a break-
through in relations between two hostile countries. There was a mutual will for such 
change, but various circumstances were making it difficult, such as the ideological 
dissonance and the issue of Taiwan – American ally in conflict with the PRC. A trigger 
for political rapprochement was therefore needed and table tennis exchange served 
this purpose. 
It was unclear whether the employment of particularly table tennis for diplomatic 
reasons was intentional or coincidental. Most evidently it was a hybrid of two. There 
was a need for non-political contact and table tennis world championships in Japan was 
a convenient and safe opportunity for both China and the US to establish one. 
The efflorescence of initiatives to employ sport for the sake of diplomacy in the US 
after the success of ping-pong diplomacy in 1971 confirms the hypothesis concerning 
its impact on American society and policy-makers. There were obvious limitations, as 
for example American Department of State was reluctant to some sports exchanges. 
Nevertheless, such initiatives were repeated, particularly in the 1970s, denoting the 
legacy of the event. Today the United States belong to the most sophisticated countries 
concerning sports diplomacy. The success of ping-pong diplomacy is most probably 
one of the reasons for this.
The research allowed to make various observations concerning some of the diplo-
matic methods pursued by China. This concerns referring to foreigners familiar with 
Chinese culture as “friends” and thus utilizing them as ‘ambassadors’ of China, as well 
as using grassroots exchanges (such as athletic) in order to communicate willingness 
to make important political or economic gestures. It is also characteristic that in case 
there are different views on major issues in Chinese government, policy-makers like 
to avoid responsibility for political decisions by instrumentalising foreigners, as in 
the case of establishing relations with the United States.
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